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“I believe that we can avoid violence only in so far as we practice this attitude of reason-
ableness in dealing with one other in social life. [This attitude] may be characterized by
a remark like this: ”I think I am right, but I may be wrong and you may be right.” [...]
One of the main di culties is that it always takes two to make a discussion reasonable.”
Karl Popper (1963, p. 357)
1. Introduction
It is hard to disagree with the view that many ideological conflicts are violent precisely
because individuals, often against the evidence, negate that they “may be wrong and that
[the opponent] may be right.”
The possibility of beliefs manipulation in situations of conflict has received little scrutiny
by economists but has been amply documented by the psychological literature. Several
studies point out that conflicts are exacerbated when individuals erroneously believe that
the opponents’ interests are directly opposed to their own when, in fact, they might be
compatible.1 A closely related bias is the hawkish bias (Kahneman and Renshon, 2009),
which makes individuals see threats as more dreadful than reality would suggest. Such faulty
perceptions are usually the result of distortions in the way individuals search and process
information (Pinkley et al, 1995) as well as of propaganda campaigns by governments or
other political groups.2
The hawkish bias is not the only type of bias that is observed in situations of conflict.
According to the psychological literature, individuals may sometimes underestimate, instead
of overestimating, external threats. Such dovish attitudes are often entertained by minority
groups while coping with oppression from socially or economically dominant groups.3 For
instance, various studies argue that especially during slavery, African Americans learned that
passivity towards the oppressors was a necessary survival strategy. Similarly, governments
may resort to appeasement to defuse conflicts. The most well-known historical example is
the appeasement strategy pursued by the British government towards Germany before World
1Such bias is known in the psychological literature as fixed-pie perception, (Bazerman and Neale, 1983,
and Thompson and Hastie, 2000).
2For instance, Yanagizawa (2009) finds a positive e↵ect of hate speech over the radio on casualties from
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) investigate the role of media in strengthening
an anti-American bias in the Arab population.
3See Lewin (1948) and, more recently, Jost and Thompson (2000). Ferenczi (1932) first studied the
phenomenon of “identification with the aggressor” when facing an inescapable threat.
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War II– a strategy that was justified by the conviction that German territorial aspirations
were partly legitimate as well as by an underestimation of the German threat.4
The goal of this paper is to investigate under what conditions the participants in a con-
flict adopt either dovish or hawkish attitudes. This subject matter should be of interest
to economists for at least two reasons. First, individuals’ attitudes in a conflict a↵ect the
amount of wasted resources in the fight and, consequently, may have consequences on eco-
nomic development (Collier et al., 2003). Second, to the extent that such attitudes stem from
distortions in the way individuals process information, we expect them to be associated with
bad policy decisions, which are obviously detrimental to welfare
In this paper, we consider a game of conflict where two individuals (or two groups of
individuals) fight in order to impose their preferred policy. A key feature of the model is
that one participant in the conflict has state-dependent preferences over policy alternatives.
In other terms, his preferred policy depends on the realized state of nature. We assume
two possible states: in one state, the policies that maximize the utilities of both opponents
are di↵erent, while in the other state they are identical (i.e., the opponents’ preferences are
aligned). Crucially, we assume that the current state is not observable by the two opponents.
This implies that the individual with state-dependent preferences cannot be ex-ante certain
about the optimality of the policy that he is trying to impose. Ex ante, he has doubts: he
entertains the possibility that the policy preferred by the opponent might be the “right”one.
Before entering the conflict the individual with state-dependent preferences naively relies
on the information provided by an advisor (the principal) who shares his same preferences
over policy alternatives. The principal (e.g., a parent or a political leader) is characterized
by an altruism parameter, which measures the extent to which the principal internalizes
the e↵ort cost exerted by the agent in the conflict. The principal is assumed to be better
(although not necessarily perfectly) informed than his agent about the current state. In
particular, the principal receives one of two signals: one signal is perfectly informative about
the current state (hence, it leaves no doubt about the policy that maximizes the agent’s
utility), while the other is not. After learning the signal, the principal communicates with
the agent by sending a public message.
4See Rock (2000) who discusses this and other more successful cases of appeasement, such as Great
Britain’s resolution of territorial disputes with the US from 1896 to 1903.
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Our results show that whether or not the principal is truthful depends on two key param-
eters. First, manipulation of information does not take place when the prior probability of
being in a state where the opponents’ preferences are not aligned is su ciently low. Since
we expect that prior probability to be high in a heterogeneous society, this suggests that
truthtelling is more likely in homogenous societies. Second, we show that the principal is
truthful when nature’s signals are more precise.
Whenever manipulation of information occurs, it takes two forms. Under some parameter
values, the principal induces hawkish attitudes in the agent. That is, he removes any doubt
that the agent may have had about the possibility that the opponent’s preferred policy is
optimal for him. As a result, the hawkish agent strenuously fights. For other parameter
values, we show that the principal induces dovish attitudes in his agent. That is, he always
tells the agent that he has received the noisy signal. The principal does so even when the
evidence that he has received indicates that the policy that the opponent would choose is
certainly not optimal for the agent. As a result, the dovish agent exerts little e↵ort because
he entertains the possibility that the policy that the opponent is trying to impose may be
optimal.
There are three considerations that determine the choice of the message by the princi-
pal. First, removing doubts induces the agent to exert higher e↵ort. Not surprisingly,
this motivating e↵ect is more valuable to the principal, the lower is his altruism parameter.
Second, due to a strategic interdependence in the game of conflict, instilling doubts in the
agent decreases the average e↵ort exerted by both opponents and reduces the conflict’s Pareto
ine ciency. This e↵ect is valuable because the two opponents cannot credibly commit to low
e↵ort levels. Instilling doubts is then a commitment device for the principal. In contrast to
the motivating e↵ect, we show that the moderating e↵ect is more valuable to the principal,
the higher is his altruism parameter. It is important to stress that the moderating e↵ect
does not arise because the principal over-internalizes the e↵ort exerted by the agent. As
will be shown, the moderating e↵ect dominates even when the principal internalizes only
half of the cost of e↵ort exerted by his agent. Third, the principal also needs to make sure
that the message induces the agent to select the correct policy in case of victory– at least in
expectations.
In Sections 5 and 6 we modify two assumptions of the basic model. Section 5 relaxes
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the assumption that the agent is naive. Instead, we suppose that the agent understands the
principal’s incentive to manipulate information. We find that the message strategy when
the agent is naive remains an equilibrium strategy when the agent is sophisticated. The
sophisticated agent, however, does not update his prior in the regions of parameters in which
the principal pools. Section 6 keeps the hypothesis of naveite´, but makes the assumption that
the principal’s message is privately communicated. We show that private communication
makes conflicts more violent.
In Section 7, we extend the basic model by supposing that the agent can acquire precise
information if he conducts autonomous research. With some positive probability autonomous
research is successful and the agent perfectly observes the current state of the world. The
principal’s message a↵ects the incentives of the agent to learn by himself. In particular, a
hawkish message reduces the agent’s incentive to acquire information that may lead to a
revision of his beliefs: in other terms, such message makes the agent more dogmatic. Among
other findings, we show that the higher is the probability of successful research, the weaker
are the principal’s incentives to induce hawkish attitudes. This suggests that societies (or
groups) that have access to e cient ways of doing research (such as, well-supplied libraries,
media and a good educational system) are less prone to hawkish attitudes.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the related literature.
Sections 3 presents the basic setup where the agent is naive and communication is public. The
results of the basic model are presented in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 modify the basic setting
by assuming, respectively, a sophisticated agent and private communication. In Section 7
we suppose that the agent can obtain precise information on his own. Section 8 concludes.
For ease of exposition, all proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Review of the Literature
First, the paper is related to a growing literature that studies the transmission of preferences,
beliefs, and social norms (see the survey by Bisin and Verdier, 2010). In Bisin and Verdier
(2000, 2001) cultural transmission is the result of interactions inside the family and in the
population at large. When parents are able to influence the probability with which children
inherit their parents’ preferences, they show that the distribution of cultural traits in the
population converges to a heterogenous distribution. More recently, various papers have
looked at intergenerational transmission of norms concerning fertility and female labor supply
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decisions (Fernandez and Fogli, 2009), of values favoring trust and cooperation (Tabellini,
2008a,b and Algan and Cahuc, 2010) and of preferences regarding patience and work ethic
(Doepke and Zilibotti, 2006).
This paper is also related to recent literature that deals with various examples of distorted
collective understanding of reality, such as anti and pro-redistribution ideologies (Be´nabou,
2008, Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006), over-optimism (and over-pessimism) about the value of ex-
isting cultural norms (Dessi, 2008), contagious exuberance in organizations (Be´nabou, 2013),
and no-trust-no-trade equilibria due to pessimistic beliefs about the trustworthiness of others
(Guiso et al., 2008). In Be´nabou (2008, 2013), the individuals themselves distort own process-
ing of information. Here instead we consider a model of indoctrination where one opponent
in the conflict receives (possibly manipulated) information from his principal.5 Contrary to
Guiso et al. (2008), where parents can perfectly choose the beliefs of their children, indoctri-
nation possibilities are more limited here because the principal can a↵ect the agent’s beliefs
only by misreporting the private signal that he has received. In Be´nabou (2013) censorship
and denial occur because individuals have anticipatory feelings.6 In our model the principal
may decide to misreport the truth for a di↵erent set of reasons: to motivate his own agent (a
similar motive is also present in Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002, 2006) and also, due to strategic
interdependence in the game of conflict, to a↵ect the strategy of the opponent. Notice that
the latter motive arises in our model also if the principal is perfectly altruistic.7
Finally, we briefly review the vast literature on social conflict. Starting from the classic
contributions by Grossman (1991) and Skaperdas (1992), the literature has developed theo-
retical models to study the determinants of social conflict.8 Recently, Caselli and Coleman
(2013) and Esteban and Ray (2008a, 2008b) have focused on the role of ethnic divisions;
Besley and Persson (2008a, 2008b) have investigated the economic determinants of social
5 As discussed in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), a model of indoctrination is formally identical to a model
where individuals with imperfect willpower distort the information they have received to a↵ect their e↵ort
decision in the future.
6See the pioneering paper of Akerlof and Dickens (1982), where beliefs a↵ect agents’ utilities through
anticipation of future payo↵s. More recently, among others, see Caplin and Leahy (2001).
7This is di↵erent from Carillo and Mariotti (2000) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2002, 2006), where a necessary
condition to have strategic ignorance or beliefs manipulation is to have disagreement between the multiples
selves (that is, time-inconsistent preferences). See also the classic model of strategic information transmission
of Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the sender has no incentive to misreport if he has the same utility of
the receiver.
8See the surveys of Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Jackson and Morelli (2011).
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conflict, while Weingast (1997) and Bates (2008) have studied the importance of institutional
constraints. It should be noticed that in most papers on the subject, the parties in the
conflict fight over a given amount of resources (among the exceptions see Esteban and Ray,
2011). In contrast, we consider a conflict over an ideological dimension, which we expect
to be more susceptible to beliefs’ manipulation. In Jackson and Morelli (2007), citizens may
strategically delegate the leadership of their country to a more hawkish politician in order
to extract more transfers from the other country. Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2012) consider a
model of conflict where each opponent has private information about his cost of waging war.
In their model, an extremist group, who is able to observe the type of one opponent, may
engage in various acts (such as, a terroristic attack) so as to a↵ect the fighting strategies of
both opponents. Finally, Anderlini et al. (2010) consider a dynastic game of conflict with
private communication across generations and show that destructive wars can be sustained
by a sequential equilibrium for some system of beliefs. However, their model is very di↵erent
from ours along various dimensions. For example, in their setting communication is about
past history, which has no direct e↵ect on current payo↵s, while in our model it concerns the
current state of nature, which directly a↵ects players’ payo↵s.
3. The Basic Model
Consider a model with three players: A,B and P. Individuals A (he) and B (she) play a game
of conflict. The winner of the conflict is able to impose his or her preferred policy to the loser.
We let x denote the policy, where x 2 X. To streamline the analysis, X includes only two
alternatives: X = {a, b} . The model is su ciently general to admit various interpretations.
For example, it could describe a conflict between two political factions in order to decide the
type of economic policy (government intervention vs. laissez faire) or the type of constitution
(theocracy vs. secular democracy) to adopt in the country.
Individual A is associated to P. The role of P is to provide information to A prior to the
beginning of the game of conflict. Individual P is assumed to be (more or less) altruistic
towards A. Throughout this paper, we shall refer to P as the “principal” and to A as the
“agent”. Depending on the specific application, the principal can be interpreted in di↵erent
ways. In a model of intergenerational cultural transmission, we can view P as A’s parent.
Alternatively, P could represent a political leader who is able to provide information to A
through government controlled media. Finally, one could think of P and A as two multiple
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selves that exist at di↵erent times within the same individual.
The utility of individual i, where i = A,B, is
U i(ci, x, ✓) =  ci + ui(x, ✓), (1)
where ci is the cost of e↵ort exerted in the conflict and ui(x, ✓) is a term that depends on
policy x and on the current state, denoted ✓ 2 ⌦.
There are only two possible states of the world: ⌦ = {✓a, ✓b} . The state is randomly drawn
by nature. In state ✓b the preferences of A and B are aligned: the policy that maximizes
the utility of both individuals is b. In state ✓a we assume instead that individuals disagree
on the correct policy to implement: A’s preferred policy is a, while B’s preferred policy is
b. Throughout the paper we will denote ✓b as the state of alignment and ✓a as the state of
conflict. The assumption that individuals with di↵erent views may sometimes agree seems
plausible. For example, in particular conditions an individual who usually supports free-
market policies may agree with a left-wing individual about the opportunity of government
intervention.
The following matrix summarizes the preferred policies by each individual in each state:
A 0s optimal policy B 0s optimal policy
✓b b b
✓a a b
For simplicity, the term ui(x, ✓) is either zero or one: it is equal to one if the appropriate
policy for individual i in state ✓ is selected, and zero otherwise. More formally,
uA(b, ✓b) = uB(b, ✓b) = uA(a, ✓a) = uB(b, ✓a) = 1,
uA(a, ✓b) = uB(a, ✓a) = uA(b, ✓a) = uB(a, ✓b) = 0.
We assume incomplete information about the current state of the world. Note that indi-
vidual B, unlike A, does not need to know the current state in order to decide which policy
to adopt in case of victory. In fact, he has no doubt that b is the appropriate policy. On
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the contrary, A needs to know the current state of nature in order to determine which is the
appropriate policy to adopt.
As mentioned above, P is assumed to be (more or less) altruistic towards A. His utility is
UP (cA, x, ✓) =   cA + uA(x, ✓). (2)
Let 0     1. When   = 1, the utility of P coincides with the one of A. When   < 1,
the principal is not fully altruistic vis-a`-vis his agent: P does not fully internalize the cost of
e↵ort exerted by A. However, it is important to notice that the principal does not disagree
with his agent on the right policy to adopt in each state ✓.
The prior probability that all players assign to the state of conflict ✓a is denoted by ⇢.
We will assume that ⇢ 2 (1/2, 1): that is, the two individuals are (ex-ante) more likely to
be in a state of conflict than in a state of alignment. To some extent, ⇢ can be viewed as
a measure of ex-ante societal heterogeneity. In fact, we expect that two randomly selected
individuals from a heterogenous society are likely to disagree on various issues; consequently,
we expect that the prior ⇢ will be high.
3.1. Timing and Information Structure
There are three periods: t = 0, 1, 2. No discounting is assumed. At t = 0, information
transmission from P to A takes place. At t = 1, A and B play a game of conflict. At t = 2,
the winner decides the policy. We now discuss each stage in detail.
At t = 0, P privately observes a signal s 2 {↵,  } which is (not necessarily fully) informa-
tive about the current state ✓. Signal ↵ (resp. signal  ) increases the probability assessment
of being in state ✓a (resp. ✓b). We assume that signal ↵ is perfectly informative and leaves
no doubt that the state is ✓a. Signal   is noisy and indicates that the state may not be ✓a.
In other terms,   makes the principal doubt about the optimality of policy a.9
9The thrust of most of the results would not change with a more symmetric information structure. What
is important is that one signal goes against the prior (and fosters doubts about the optimality of policy a),
while the other signal reinforces the belief that a is optimal. The assumption that ↵ is perfectly informative,
however, simplifies the algebra. Without this assumption, the game of conflict would never be symmetric: B
would always be the individual with the highest stakes in the conflict.
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The conditional probabilities of receiving signals ↵ and   in state ✓b are
Pr(↵ | ✓b) = 0 and Pr(  | ✓b) = 1. (3)
That is, signal ↵ is never received if we are in state of alignment ✓b.
In state ✓a, the conditional probabilities are
Pr(↵ | ✓a) =   and Pr(  | ✓a) = 1   , (4)
where   2 (0, 1).
Let ⇢sP denote P ’s posterior probability that the state is ✓a after signal s. Principal P
updates his prior according to Bayes’ Rule:
⇢ P =
⇢(1   )
1  ⇢   ⇢, (5)
⇢↵P = 1. (6)
The parameter   can be viewed as a measure of the precision of nature’s signals. When
  = 0 the principal’s posterior after   coincides with his initial prior ⇢. As   goes to one
signals become more informative.
After receiving a signal from nature, P sends a message m, where m 2 {↵,  }.10 The
posterior belief of player A after message m is denoted by ⇢mA .
The principal’s message is assumed to be public. Whether or not assuming public commu-
nication is appropriate depends on the specific situation the model addresses. One instance
in which our assumption is more fitting is when we interpret the message strategy as inter-
generational cultural transmission or political propaganda. Since education and political
persuasion are likely to be continual and long-lasting processes, they can be more easily ob-
served. Section 6 considers the case in which the message by P is privately observed by
A.
An important assumption of the basic model is that A is naive: A believes the signal that
10Notice that the principal cannot fabricate new evidence: the message space and the signal space coincide.
A similar assumption is also made in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), Be´nabou (2008, 2013), and Dessi (2008).
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P sends. In other words, A does not realize that the principal may not always tell the truth.
We also suppose that the naivete´ of A is known to B and to P . Upon receiving message m,
A’s posterior is equal to (5) when m =   and is equal to (6) when m = ↵. Complete naivete´
is also allowed, as a special case, in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006, p. 710). Similarly, in models
of cultural transmission it is assumed that parents can easily manipulate their children. For
instance, in Doepke and Zilibotti (2006) and Guiso et al. (2008) parents can directly choose
the preferences or the priors of their children. In our model, the ability of the principal to
manipulate the agent’s beliefs is weaker than in those papers. Recall in fact that here the
principal cannot fabricate new evidence. As a result, the principal cannot perfectly determine
the beliefs of the agent. In Section 5 we will analyze the case of a sophisticated agent.
Naivete´ can be partly justified on the basis of various experimental and behavioral evidence
suggesting that individuals who rely on the advise of others do not fully take into account the
incentives of the information provider. For instance, Malmendier and Shantikumar (2007)
find that small investors follow recommendations by analysts literally and do not discount
the bias due to analysts’ a liation. Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007) argue that Fox News
viewers underestimate the bias of the media source and therefore are subject to persuasion.
Cai and Wang (2006) test in a controlled laboratory experiment the model by Crawford and
Sobel (1982) and find that receivers rely more on the senders’s message compared with what
the theory predicts.11
In some contexts naivete´ seems a more natural assumption than full sophistication. For
instance, we expect individuals to be especially naive when P coincides with a national
government or a parent. In countries where education (at school and home) is hierarchical
and children are not taught to think independently, individuals may be induced to naively
trust the messages sent by their government and parents.12 In Section 5 we will show that
the principal prefers to deal with a naive agent than with a sophisticated one. He is therefore
likely to choose to interact with a naive agent or, whenever possible, he is likely to teach the
11Cain et al. (2005) conduct an experiment where individuals must guess the number of coins in a jar by
relying on the advice of experts who can inspect the jar. Even when it is common knowledge that experts
are paid for how high the subjects’ guess is, they find that individuals do not discount enough to compensate
for the experts’ incentive to exaggerate their advice.
12Using data from the world value survey, Algan and Cahuc (2005) find that when asked what are the
values that children should be taught, there is heterogeneity across countries in the way respondents value
promotion of child independence.
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agent to be naive.
3.2. Game of Conflict
At t = 1, we posit the following game of conflict. Individuals A and B simultaneously choose
e↵ort levels cA and cB, where cA, cB   0. The probability of i winning the contest given the
e↵ort decisions of the two opponents is
pi(ci, c i) =
8>><>>:
0 if ci < c i,
1 if ci > c i,
1
2 if ci = c i.
(7)
In words, the individual that exerts the highest e↵ort wins with probability one. This
technology of conflict, which is extremely sensitive to e↵ort di↵erences, turns out to be
analytically tractable for our purposes.13
Finally, at t = 2, the winner of the conflict is able to pick his or her preferred policy.
4. Results
In each period, players maximize their expected utility given their beliefs at that stage and
given the strategies of the other players. For the principal, a strategy specifies a message for
every signal s. For i = A,B, the e↵ort and the decision strategies specify the e↵ort in the
game of conflict and the policy decision in case of victory for every message, respectively.
The model is solved by backward induction, starting from the last period.
4.1. Policy Decisions
At t = 2, the decision rule of individual B in case she wins the conflict is immediate: B
chooses b.
Conversely, A picks a only if his posterior probability of being in a state of conflict is
greater than 1/2, which constitutes the threshold of indi↵erence between the two policy
13In the social conflict literature, this technology of war is considered, for instance, by Jackson and Morelli
(2007, ex. 3). This type of contest, known in the literature as all-pay auction, has also been considered by
the lobbying and rent-seeking literature: e.g., Ellingsen (1991), Baye et al. (1993), and Che and Gale (1998).
For a survey of other technologies of conflict, see Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007).
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decisions. Let DA denote the decision made by A in case of victory:
DA =
(
a if ⇢mA > 1/2,
b if ⇢mA  1/2.
(8)
4.2. The Game of Conflict
At the beginning of t = 1, both A and B observe the message m sent by P. Individual B
knows that A is naive. Consequently, she is able to figure out ⇢mA .
We now determine the e↵ort decisions at t = 1. The type of conflict described by (7)
is equivalent to an all-pay auction. Note in fact that A and B incur an e↵ort cost that is
the same whether they win or lose. The gain from winning is given by the possibility of
choosing the most-preferred policy. This possibility is more or less valuable to A depending
on his beliefs. More specifically, the gain for A is (2⇢mA   1). This value is obtained by
subtracting 1  ⇢mA (the expected payo↵ in case B wins) from ⇢mA (the expected payo↵ in case
a is implemented).
It is well known that the game of conflict analyzed here does not have a Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies, but does have a unique equilibrium in continuous mixed strategies
(see Hillman and Riley, 1988). To find out the equilibrium e↵ort levels, two cases must be
considered: ⇢mA  1/2 and ⇢mA > 1/2. First, suppose that parameters are such that A believes
that the current state is more likely to be ✓b than ✓a. When ⇢mA  1/2, it is immediate from
(8) that A has no incentive to fight. Then, cA = cB = 0 and b is chosen. The second
possibility is that ⇢mA > 1/2. In this case, from (8) we obtain that A and B want to pursue
di↵erent policies: a conflict is then inevitable. Let Gi(.) denote the equilibrium cumulative
distribution of individual i’s e↵ort. The expected payo↵ to A from exerting e↵ort cA is
EUA = [1 GB(cA)] (1  ⇢mA ) +GB(cA)⇢mA   cA. (9)
To obtain (9) note that with probability GB(cA) individual A wins and implements policy a,
which gives A an expected payo↵ equal to ⇢mA . With complementary probability, B wins and
implements b, which gives A an expected payo↵ equal to 1  ⇢mA . We can rewrite (9) as
EUA = (1  ⇢mA ) +GB(cA) (2⇢mA   1)  cA. (10)
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From expression (10) it is immediate to verify that A never exerts an e↵ort level strictly
greater than his value of winning, which is given by 2⇢mA  1. Further, note that A’s maximum
e↵ort level goes to zero when ⇢mA goes to 1/2. Intuitively, when the two states become equally
likely, A has no incentive to enter into a conflict.
Note that B’s valuation is 1, which is weakly greater than A’s valuation. This is because
B has no doubt that b is the right policy. The expected payo↵ to B of choosing cB is instead
EUB = GA(cB)  cB. (11)
The equilibrium of the game of conflict is characterized by the following proposition. The
proof, which is contained in the Appendix, follows Hillman and Riley (1988).
PROPOSITION 1: Let message m be given. If 0  ⇢mA  1/2, we have cA = cB = 0
and policy b is selected.
If instead 1/2 < ⇢mA  1, in the unique Nash equilibrium, B randomizes his e↵ort uni-
formly on [0, 2⇢mA   1] . Player A exerts zero e↵ort with probability equal to 2(1  ⇢mA ).
Conditional upon exerting positive e↵ort, A also randomizes uniformly on [0, 2⇢mA   1].
Proposition 1 establishes that in case of conflict the maximum e↵ort level of both indi-
viduals is given by 2⇢mA   1, the valuation of the lower-valuing individual. Moreover, it states
that individual A exerts zero e↵ort with strictly positive probability, which is increasing in
his degree of doubt. In contrast, individual B (the higher-valuing individual) always enters
the conflict.
It follows from Proposition 1 that when ⇢mA = 1, the conflict is total : both players enter
the conflict with probability one and e↵ort is distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1] .
It is important to notice that the principal’s message a↵ects the e↵ort levels by both
opponents in the conflict. Appealing to Proposition 1, for every message m we can compute
the expected sum of e↵ort levels of the two opponents as of time 1:
E(cA + cB,m) = (2⇢
m
A   1)⇢mA . (12)
It is crucial to observe that (12) is increasing in ⇢mA : A’s doubts contain the escalation of
violence in the conflict.
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4.3. Message Strategies
Going backwards, we analyze the information transmission game at t = 0. This is immediate
to solve given the simple structure with a binary state of the world and binary signals.
Intentionally, we kept the setting as tractable as possible. In fact, our interest here is not to
contribute to the information transmission literature but to establish conditions of economic
nature under which beliefs are manipulated.
Depending on the underlying parameters (namely,  ,   and the initial prior of being in
state ✓a) we will show (see Propositions 2 and 3) that the principal uses one of three message
strategies. First, there exists a region of parameter values where the principal reports nature’s
signal in a truthful manner. Second, for other parameters we obtain that P always sends
message ↵ regardless of the actual signal received from nature. In this case, we say that P
induces a hawkish attitude in his agent. Finally, there exists a third region of parameters
where P always sends message   regardless of the actual signal. In this other case, we say
that P induces a dovish attitude of systematic doubt.
To solve for the equilibrium strategies, we compute the payo↵s to P for every message
and for every signal. Given that we consider a model with two signals and two messages,
four cases must be considered. We let V P (s,m) denote the expected utility of the principal
after receiving signal s and after sending message m.
First, suppose that nature sends signal ↵ and P is truthful. In this case, A and B play a
total war and P ’s expected payo↵ is
V P (↵,↵) =   
2
+
1
2
. (13)
To explain the first term of (13), recall that in a total conflict the expected e↵ort exerted
by A is equal to 1/2 (see Proposition 1) and that P internalizes only a proportion   of the
agent’s e↵ort. To explain the second term, note that a total conflict is symmetric and both
players win with equal probabilities. Since the actual state is ✓a, P earns a payo↵ equal to
one if A wins and zero if B wins.
Second, suppose nature sends signal ↵ but P sends the false message  . In this case, A
is induced to doubt. Two sub-cases must be considered. If the agents’s posterior after the
message is su ciently low (namely, ⇢ A  1/2) we know from Proposition 1 that A does not
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participate in the conflict, b is chosen and consequently the principal obtains a payo↵ equal
to
V P (↵,  ) = 0, if ⇢ A  1/2 (14)
If instead ⇢ A > 1/2 we have that A enters the conflict with probability
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
 1.
Conditional on A exerting positive e↵ort, we know from Proposition 1 that A’s expected
e↵ort is
2⇢ A   1
2
(15)
and that both players have the same probabilities of winning. Therefore, when the current
state is ✓a, making A doubt gives the principal an expected payo↵
V P (↵,  ) =
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘   ⇣2⇢ A   1⌘
2
+
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
2
, if ⇢ A > 1/2 (16)
Third, suppose that nature sends signal   and that P is truthful. Two sub-cases must
again be discussed. When ⇢ A  1/2, there is no conflict, b is chosen and, consequently, the
principal’s expected payo↵ is
V P ( ,  ) = 1  ⇢ P , if ⇢ A  1/2. (17)
If instead ⇢ A > 1/2 a conflict occurs and the principal’s expected payo↵ is
V P ( ,  ) =
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘   ⇣2⇢ A   1⌘
2
+
2⇢ A   1
2
+ 2
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘
(1  ⇢ P ), if ⇢ A > 1/2. (18)
To understand why (18) has an additional term compared to (16), notice that P now expects
to obtain a positive payo↵ when A does not fight: since the principal has received signal  ,
his probability assessment of being in state ✓b is not zero, but 1  ⇢ P . Since (18) is computed
under the assumption that P is truthful, we have ⇢ P = ⇢
 
A.
Fourth, and finally, suppose P receives signal   but sends the false message ↵. Then, a
total conflict arises. When A wins (an event occurring with probability 1/2), a is chosen and
the principal expects a payo↵ of ⇢ P . With complementary probability B wins, b is chosen
and the principal expects a payo↵ of 1  ⇢ P . Therefore, the expected payo↵ to the principal
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is
V P ( ,↵) =   
2
+
1
2
. (19)
After computing the payo↵s (13)-(19), it is a matter of simple algebra to determine the
equilibrium message strategies for all  .
Before solving the model, we discuss the three considerations that matter in the message
decision. First, P has an incentive to remove A’s doubts about the possibility that B may
be right in order to increase A’s e↵ort in the conflict. This motivating e↵ect is present in
our model because the principal does not fully internalize the cost of e↵ort of A. Second,
P may want to instill doubts in A to reduce the ine ciency of the game of conflict. To
understand this moderating e↵ect, recall from Proposition 1 that if A has more doubts,
conflicts are less violent because the equilibrium e↵ort levels of both players decrease: due to
strategic complementarities, instilling doubts moderates the escalation of violence. This e↵ect
is valuable because e↵ort is wasteful and because the two opponents cannot credibly commit
to low e↵ort levels. Instilling doubts is then a commitment device for the principal. Using
this device, however, is costly. In fact, when the state is ✓a instilling doubts induces A to exit
the conflict with positive probability. This implies that policy b, which is suboptimal for A
in state ✓a, is more often implemented.14 Third, the principal also needs to make sure that
his message induces A to select the right policy in case of victory– at least in expectations.
The trade-o↵ between motivating and moderating e↵ects depends, among other things, on
 . Consider, for instance, a principal with high  . The motivating e↵ect is not very valuable
to him because from equations (13) and (19) we know that his expected payo↵ from a total
conflict is close to zero. Therefore, a principal with high   would rather reduce the conflict’s
ine ciency than maximize the probability that A exerts positive e↵ort. The converse holds
true for a principal with low  : his expected payo↵ from a total conflict is su ciently large
that he always prefers to maximize the probability that A enters the conflict, even at the cost
of inducing a total conflict. This is why we may observe dovish (resp. hawkish) attitudes
when   is high (resp. low). It is important to notice that the moderating e↵ect does not
arise because the principal over-internalizes the e↵ort exerted by the agent (throughout   is
14The two e↵ects can be appreciated by looking at the expected payo↵s (16) and (13). Message   when
the signal is ↵ reduces the agent’s expected e↵ort– the first term of (16) is higher than the first term of (13)–
but increases the probability that the correct policy a is not implemented–the second term of (16) is lower
than the first term of (13).
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assumed to be less than one). As shown below, the moderating e↵ect dominates even when
the principal internalizes only half of the e↵ort cost.
It is possible to show that when ⇢ is su ciently low, the principal is truthful because
sending false messages would induce A to select the wrong policy at t = 2.
LEMMA 1: When ⇢  1/(2   ) the principal is truthful for any  .
To understand Lemma 1, suppose that ⇢ is just above 1/2. Note that after receiving
signal  , the principal’s posterior ⇢ P would fall below 1/2: the principal would change his
view about the optimality of a and start to believe that b is the correct decision. Then, P
has no incentive to send message ↵, which would induce A to enter a total conflict with the
goal of imposing policy a. Similarly, after receiving signal ↵ the principal has no incentive
to send the false message   since A would incorrectly believe that b is the right decision and
would give up the fight and earn a payo↵ of zero. As will be shown in Propositions 2 and 3
below, when   is either zero or one, the condition of Lemma 1 is also a necessary condition
for truthtelling.
Next, in Lemma 2 we discuss the strategy of a fully altruistic principal.
LEMMA 2: Suppose that   = 1. When ⇢ > 1/(2    ) the principal always sends message
 .
To understand Lemma 2, note from (13) and (19) that the expected payo↵ to the principal
of a total war is zero when   = 1. As a result, the motivating e↵ect is absent: the principal
has no interest in pushing the agent to a total fight. On the contrary, the moderating e↵ect
is present: inducing dovish attitudes is a way to credibly commit the agent to exert low (but
positive) e↵ort. Provided that the prior is su ciently high, always sending signal   allows
the principal to de-escalate the conflict without inducing A to support policy b.
As we decrease  , the motivating e↵ect starts to operate. In Proposition 2, we argue
that as long as 1/2     1 the moderating e↵ect still dominates and dovish attitudes are
sometimes observed. Instead, when   < 1/2 the motivating e↵ect dominates the moderating
one and hawkish attitudes are sometimes observed (see Proposition 3).
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PROPOSITION 2: (Dovish Bias) Fix any   2 (0, 1) and suppose that 1/2     1. For
all ⇢  ⇢, where
⇢ =
1
2 (1   ) +   , (20)
information transmission is truthful. When instead ⇢ > ⇢, the principal P reports  
regardless of nature’s signal.
PROPOSITION 3: (Hawkish Bias) Fix any   2 (0, 1) and suppose that 0    < 1/2. For
all ⇢  b⇢, where b⇢ = 1
2(1   )(1   ) +   , (21)
information transmission is truthful. When instead ⇢ > b⇢, the principal P reports ↵
regardless of nature’s signal.
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Figure 1: Beliefs Manipulation in the (⇢, ) space with   = 0.6
In Figure 1, for a given  , we draw the parameter regions in the (⇢, ) space where we
observe the three types of equilibria of our model: dovish, hawkish and truthful. As stated in
Propositions 2 and 3, P sends truthful reports when ⇢ is su ciently low. When instead ⇢ is
large, the agent holds either hawkish attitudes (in the lower-right region) or dovish attitudes
(in the upper-right region). When ⇢ is high, truthtelling is less likely because the principal
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can a↵ect the e↵ort of the agent (by either motivating or moderating him) without distorting
the agent’s decision in case of victory.
Interestingly, notice that when   ' 1/2 the conditions for the existence of a truthful
equilibrium are more likely to be satisfied. In this range, in fact, the principal’s altruism
parameter is not too low (so that inequality (18)   (19) is satisfied) but not too high (so that
inequality (13)   (16) is also satisfied). In words, when   is closed to 1/2, P is su ciently
altruistic to avoid a total conflict when nature’s signal is   but not too altruistic to prevent
a total conflict when nature’s signal is ↵.
If nature’s signals become more precise (i.e.,   increases), it is easy to verify that both
cuto↵s b⇢ and ⇢ increase: both the dovish and hawkish regions shrink. More precision reduces
the incentives to manipulate beliefs. Graphically, this can be appreciated by comparing
Figure 1 (where   is fixed at 0.6) and Figure 2 (where   has been increased to 0.85). When
  is high, after a false message the posteriors of the principal and of the agent would likely
lie on di↵erent sides of 1/2, the threshold of indi↵erence discussed in Section 4.1. In this
case, the principal tells the truth in order to avoid wrong policy decisions. In the limit, when
both signals become perfectly informative (  = 1), the principal is truthful for all parameter
values.
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Figure 2: Beliefs Manipulation in the (⇢, ) space with   = 0.85
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4.4. Incidence and Intensity of Conflicts
Using the results of Propositions 1-3, we now investigate how the degree of societal het-
erogeneity a↵ects the likelihood that a conflict occurs (or incidence of conflict) and the total
e↵ort levels exerted in the conflict. In Figure 3 we summarize the implications of each message
strategy on conflict behavior. The vertical dashed line is drawn at ⇢ = 1/(2   ).
We now state Proposition 4 .
PROPOSITION 4: The incidence of conflict is increasing in ⇢.
The intensity of conflict is weakly increasing in ⇢ when   < 1/2 and non-monotone in ⇢
when     1/2.
To understand the first part of the proposition, notice that when ⇢ is below the vertical
dashed line in Figure 3, we know from Lemma 1 that P is truthful. In this case, conflicts
occur only when the principal truthfully sends ↵.15 When instead ⇢ is above the dashed line,
⇢mA > 1/2 for all m: conflicts always occur, regardless of nature’s signal. Since ⇢ is likely to
be high in heterogeneous societies, this suggests that the probability that a conflict occurs is
lower in homogenous societies.
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Figure 3: Incidence and Intensity of Conflicts,   = 0.6
15When instead the principal truthfully sends message  , the agent’s posterior falls below 1/2. In this case,
player A favors b and no conflict occurs.
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The second part of Proposition 4 establishes that when     1/2 the intensity of conflict
may not be monotone in ⇢. The latter result occurs because, as described in Proposition 2, in
more divided societies individuals may adopt dovish attitudes. This generates a discontinuous
drop of the overall e↵ort levels when ⇢ is equal to ⇢.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to test the theoretical predictions of our stylized model.
However, it is possible to relate our results to some of the findings obtained by the empirical
literature on civil and interstate conflicts. One result that emerges from that literature is
that the incidence of conflict is positively correlated with ethnic polarization (Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol, 2005). To the extent that ethnic polarization is a good proxy for ⇢, this result
is coherent with the first part of Proposition 4. Second, various papers have looked at the
relation between ethnicity diversity and civil wars’ duration. The relation found in the data
is either positive (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2010) or not monotone. For instance,
Collier et al. (2004) show that the duration of a conflict is at its maximum for intermediate
values of ethnic fractionalization. While not perfectly, conflict duration is likely to be related
to its intensity. Therefore, the latter empirical results are not in contradiction with the second
part of Proposition 4.16
5. Naivete´ vs Sophistication
In this section, we consider the basic model of Section 3 but remove the assumption that the
agent is naive. Instead, the agent is assumed to be sophisticated, i.e. Bayesian. We obtain
that a truthtelling equilibrium exists in the same region of parameters described in Figure 1.
However, in this region there is another equilibrium in pure communication strategies, where
players A and B simply ignore the principal’s message: a babbling equilibrium, which is a
common feature of all cheap talk games. In this equilibrium, A’s probability assessment of
being in state ✓a coincides with his prior.
In the lower-right and upper-right regions described in Figure 1, the babbling equilibrium
is the unique equilibrium in pure communication strategies. We summarize these observations
in the following proposition.
16Finding an empirical proxy of   is more challenging. One could argue that leaders of full democracies
have higher   (on this, see Jackson and Morelli, 2007). In our model, conflict’s intensity is lowest when   is
close to one (see Figure 3). Indeed, there is evidence that full democracies fight less (e.g., Maoz and Russett,
1993).
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PROPOSITION 5: ( Sophisticated Agent, Equilibria in Pure Communication Strategies)
Assume that the agent is sophisticated. A truthtelling equilibrium exists for the same
parameters as in the case where the agent is assumed to be naive. In addition, for all
parameters a babbling equilibrium exists, where both players A and B ignore the prin-
cipal’s message. In this equilibrium, A and B play the conflict phase as in Proposition
1, with posterior ⇢mA = ⇢ for all m 2 {↵,  } .
Proposition 5 states that the message strategy when the agent is naive, which we described
in Propositions 2 and 3, remains an equilibrium strategy when the agent is sophisticated.
Moreover, the information transmitted is the same in the two cases, for all parameters. The
main di↵erence between the two cases is that the sophisticated agent does not update his
prior in the regions of parameters in which the principal pools.17
Another implication of Proposition 5 is that under full sophistication, the likelihood of
conflict is still increasing in ⇢, while the intensity of conflict is increasing in the prior for all  .
In particular, at the thresholds b⇢ and ⇢ (as soon as truthful communication is not possible)
total e↵ort goes up.
It is possible to compare the expected payo↵ of the principal under various outcomes. Let
W T , WH , WD, and WB, denote, respectively, the expected payo↵ of the principal under a
truthful strategy (whether the agent is naive or sophisticated), a hawkish strategy (with a
naive agent), a dovish strategy (with a naive agent), and a babbling strategy (with a sophisti-
cated agent). By revealed preferences, we know that in the truthful parameter region we have
W T   max WD,WH , in the hawkish parameter region we have WH   max W T ,WD 
and in the dovish parameter region we have WD   max W T ,WH . Moreover the inequali-
ties hold strictly for parameters away from the boundaries between regions.
In order to compare W T and WB, it is convenient to introduce the expected value U (⇢P )
of the principal when his belief is ⇢P under the assumption that he publicly shares his infor-
17It is equally easy to see that Proposition 2 and 3 also describe the message of the principal in the following
intermediate case between full sophistication and naivete´. Suppose that the principal faces a continuum of
agents, where ⌫ and 1   ⌫ are the measures of naive and sophisticated agents. At t = 1 a conflict arises
between a randomly selected agent and the opponent. If the type of the agent is observed by the opponent,
the message strategy of P is the one described in Propositions 2-3. Moreover, to the extent that ⌫ is strictly
positive, we obtain that the expected intensity of a conflict is higher when   ' 0 than when   ' 1, exactly
as in the basic model.
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mation with the other two players. We have
U (⇢P ) =
1
2
(2⇢P   1) + 2 (1  ⇢P ) (1  ⇢P )   
2
(2⇢P   1)2 if ⇢P   1/2
U (⇢P ) = 1  ⇢P if ⇢P < 1/2.
In the case where ⇢P   1/2, the first term of the expression is the return obtained when
the agent exerts e↵ort, the second one is the return obtained when the agent exerts no e↵ort
and the last term is the cost to the principal of the agent’s e↵ort. The function U is strictly
convex in ⇢P if   < 1 and linear in ⇢P if   = 1. This implies that the principal always prefers
ex ante to release more public information.18 Thus, the following inequality holds: for any
parameter, we have W T   WB. Moreover the inequality is strict as long as   < 1, ⇢P 2 (0, 1)
and   2 (0, 1) .
Collecting these observations, we obtain the following result.
PROPOSITION 6: (Welfare Comparisons)
1 For all parameters, the principal prefers the truthful outcome to the babbling outcome.
2 In both the hawkish and the dovish regions, the principal prefers the agent to be naive
rather than sophisticated.
Point 2 in Proposition 6 provides some justification for our assumption that the agent is
naive: the principal prefers to deal with a naive agent than with a sophisticated one. He is
therefore likely to choose to interact with a naive agent or he is likely to teach the agent to
be naive.
6. Private Communication
In this section, we relax the assumption that communication is public. We assume instead
that communication is private, in the sense that the principal’s message m is observed only
by the agent A, but not by B.
We study how private communication a↵ects the three di↵erent types of equilibria we
previously identified: dovish, hawkish and truthful. We obtain that: (i) there are no dovish
18This fact is exploited in particular by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
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equilibria, for any value of the parameters; (ii) the parameter region for which hawkish
equilibria exist expands. These findings indicate that when communication is private, conflicts
are more violent.
To help understand the intuition behind these results, two observations are in order.
First, conditionally on the principal playing either a dovish or a hawkish strategy, the
equilibrium conditions of players A and B in the conflict stage are exactly the same as in the
public communication case. As a result, the equilibrium e↵ort choices are determined as in
Proposition 1. This is not true for a truthful equilibrium. In the private case, in a truthful
equilibrium, the agent A receives information from P that B does not possess. As a result,
in the conflict stage the information of the two opponents is asymmetric in favor of A in the
private communication case, whereas it is symmetric in the public communication case.
Second, for all three types of equilibria, the principal’s incentive to deviate to other
messages is not the same in the public and private cases. In the public case, any deviation
from either a dovish or hawkish strategy is observed by both players A and B. In the private
case, the deviation is observed only by the agent A.
From these two observations, we can easily deduce our first result in Proposition 7, which
says that in the private case, there is never a dovish equilibrium for any parameter value.
Indeed, suppose a hypothetic dovish equilibrium. Since A is expected to exert low e↵ort,
B is also relatively less aggressive in the conflict. Consider a deviation by the principal to
a truthful strategy. By the second observation, the e↵ort level of player B is unchanged.
For agent A, the information obtained from the truthful principal is valuable and results
in a welfare increase. This is achieved because an increase in A’s e↵ort level when receiving
message ↵ leads to higher probability of victory by A. Since e↵ort is less costly to the principal
than to the agent, this deviation is even more beneficial to the principal than it is to the agent.
As a result, it is always profitable for the principal to deviate from a dovish strategy to a
truthful one. We conclude that no dovish equilibrium exists when communication is private.
The second observation is also the driving force behind our second result in Proposition
7: the expansion of the hawkish region. The deviation to a truthful strategy is less tempting
since the deviation would not be observed by B and, consequently, would not reduce B’s
e↵ort.
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose that communication is private.
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i. (No Dovish Bias) For any value of the parameters   2 (0, 1) ,   2 [0, 1] and ⇢ 2 (0, 1) ,
there is no equilibrium in which the principal always sends message  .
ii. (Hawkish Bias) Fix any   2 (0, 1) and any   2 [0, 1] . For all ⇢   ⇢H where
⇢H =
 + 1
2    +    ,
there is an equilibrium in which the principal always sends message  . For all ⇢ < ⇢H ,
there is no such equilibrium.
Before examining the conditions for the existence of a truthful equilibrium, in Proposition
8 we characterize the equilibrium in the game of conflict between players A and B, when P
plays a truthful strategy and communication is private. Note that this case is not covered by
Proposition 1, since now player A has private information. The proof follows directly from
Proposition 1 in Siegel (2014) and is therefore omitted.
PROPOSITION 8: (Game of Conflict in a Truthful Equilibrium) Fix any   2 (0, 1) , any
  2 [0, 1] and any ⇢ 2 (0, 1) . Suppose that P plays a truthful strategy and that he
communicates privately with A. Then ⇢↵A = 1 and ⇢
 
A =
⇢(1  )
1 ⇢  .
i. If ⇢ A  1/2, in the unique Nash-Bayesian equilibrium player B exerts zero e↵ort with
probability 1   ⇢ . Conditional on exerting positive e↵ort, player B randomizes his
e↵ort uniformly on (0, ⇢ ]. Player A exerts no e↵ort upon receiving message   and
also randomizes his e↵ort uniformly on (0, ⇢ ] upon receiving message ↵.
ii. If ⇢ A > 1/2, in the unique Nash-Bayesian equilibrium player B randomizes his e↵ort
on the interval
h
0, (2⇢ A   1) (1  ⇢ ) + ⇢ 
i
with density equal to 1
2⇢ A 1
on the intervalh
0, (2⇢ A   1) (1  ⇢ )
i
and with density equal to 1 on the intervalh
(2⇢ A   1) (1  ⇢ ) , (2⇢ A   1) (1  ⇢ ) + ⇢ 
i
. Upon receiving message  , player A ex-
erts no e↵ort with probability 2
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘
and, conditionally on exerting positive e↵ort,
randomizes uniformly his e↵ort on the interval
h
0, (2⇢ A   1) (1  ⇢ )
i
. Upon receiving
message ↵, player A randomizes uniformly his e↵ort on the intervalh
(2⇢ A   1) (1  ⇢ ) , (2⇢ A   1) (1  ⇢ ) + ⇢ 
i
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This result enables us to study the set of parameters for which a truthful equilibrium
exists. When P receives from nature signal ↵, there is no reason for P to misreport. Such a
deviation can only decrease P ’s expected payo↵: it does not a↵ect B’s e↵ort, but it misleads
A into reducing his e↵ort, which from P ’s point of view is already too low. Under what
condition does P not have an incentive to misreport when receiving signal  ? This deviation
cannot possibly be profitable for the principal if ⇢ A  1/2. This is because in this case, P
believes that the optimal policy is b and therefore does not want A to exert e↵ort, which
would be the consequence of misreporting. Therefore, when ⇢ A  1/2, there always exists
a truthful equilibrium. Suppose now that ⇢ A > 1/2. In this case, when truthfully sending
message  , the principal’s expected payo↵ is✓
⇢ 
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘
+
(1  ⇢ )
2
   
2
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
(1  ⇢ )
◆⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
+ 2
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘2
. (22)
If the principal deviates to ↵, his expected payo↵ is
⇢ 
2
+ (1  ⇢ ) ⇢ A    
⇣⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
(1  ⇢ ) + ⇢ 
2
⌘
. (23)
We thus obtain the following result:
PROPOSITION 9: (Truthful Equilibrium) Suppose that communication is private. Fix
any   2 (0, 1) and any   2 [0, 1] . A truthful equilibrium exists if and only if expression
(22) is weakly greater than (23).
The region of parameters where a truthful equilibrium exists is characterized in the Ap-
pendix and is shown in Figure 4. For a given  , this region consists of all couples (⇢, )
to the left of the dashed curve in Figure 4. The continuous curve is given by ⇢H , which
was defined in Proposition 7. The comparison of Figure 4 with Figure 1 shows that under
private communication the hawkish region is strictly larger (one can verify that ⇢H  b⇢),
truthtelling is more likely when   is high, and is less likely when   is close to 1/2. Finally,
note that between the hawkish and truthful regions there is an intermediate region where no
pure equilibrium exists.19
19In this region, one can show that an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists, where the principal reports ↵
when he observes ↵, but randomizes between ↵ and   when he observes  .
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To summarize, we have shown that under private communication the principal cannot
commit to a message strategy that instills doubts in A — this explains why private commu-
nication makes conflicts more violent. Since public communication makes such commitment
possible, the principal would generally benefit from it.
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Figure 4: Private Communication (  = 0.6)
7. Independent Information Acquisition by the Agent
In Section 3, we have shown that beliefs manipulation distorts e↵ort decisions, but it does
not distort policy making. In fact, A’s decision at t = 2 on the basis of m coincides with the
decision that A would make had the true signal been known. This result occurs because the
principal does not disagree with the agent on the correct policy to implement in each state.
As a result, he does not manipulate information to the point of inducing the wrong policy
decision in the final stage.
However, it is reasonable to expect that beliefs manipulation may also lead to ine cient
decision-making. A simple extension of the basic setting allows to capture this additional
cost. We examine the e↵ect of the option for agent A to independently acquire public in-
formation, i.e. information that is also observed by player B, after receiving the principal’s
message. As in Section 3, we assume that A is naive and that the message is public.
We study the following game. The timing of events is drawn in Figure 5. As before, at
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t = 0 principal P observes signal s 2 {↵,  } and sends a message to A. After receiving the
message, the agent is now able, if he decides so, to conduct research in order to discover
the current state. Research costs k   0 and is not manipulable by A himself (or by P ).
If the research cost is incurred by the agent, the principal internalizes a proportion   of
this cost. With probability ⇡ 2 [0, 1] research is successful and the state becomes common
knowledge. With complementary probability 1   ⇡, research is not successful. We assume
that the probability of success is independent from the state ✓. As a result, nothing is learned
when research is not successful and the information structure remains unchanged.
At t = 1 with exogenous probability (1 ") 2 [0, 1] the conflict phase unfolds exactly as in
the basic model: A and B simultaneously choose the e↵ort level and the conflict’s winner is
able to select his or her preferred policy. However, with probability " the two parties are able
to avoid the conflict phase. In this case, the decision maker is decided by tossing a fair coin
without any of the two players having exerted any e↵ort. A positive " captures the possibility
that the two opponents might be able, possibly through negotiation, to avoid the ine ciency
of a conflict.20
Notice that the setting that we have just described is a generalization of the basic model
of Section 3. When " = 0 and k is arbitrarily large (or, alternatively, ⇡ = 0) the model
studied in this section coincides with the one studied before: as in the basic model, the agent
relies exclusively on the information transmitted by the principal and the two players cannot
resolve their disagreement without fighting.
P sends 
message 
A ‘s  
research 
choice 
A learns that  
the state is: 
nothing is 
learned 



btotal conflict 
arises with prob. 1
A and B 
move to 
conflict stage 
with prob. 1
total conflict 
arises with prob. 1
b is chosen 
1
a
 research 
 no research 
Figure 5: Timeline with Autonomous Research
20As will be discussed shortly, " > 0 gives A an incentive to acquire costly information.
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The model is solved by backward induction, starting from t = 2. In the final stage, a
player is able to choose his (or her) preferred policy if that player wins the conflict or if
the result of the coin toss is favorable to him (or her). In the decision rule (8), the agent’s
posterior is computed after observing m and the outcome of his research e↵ort (if any). At
t = 1, in case the conflict phase starts, the e↵ort strategies of the two opponents are given
by Proposition 1.
We now move to t = 0 and study the agent’s choice of whether or not to acquire in-
formation. It is immediate that upon receiving message ↵, the agent does not acquire any
information since he is convinced that the state is ✓a. Suppose instead that the agent has
received message  . We compute the expected payo↵ to the agent if he incurs the research
cost. With probability 1  ⇡ the research e↵ort is not successful, and the expected value for
the agent is
"
2
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘
+
"
2
max
n
⇢ A, 1  ⇢ A
o
+ (1  ")(1  ⇢ A). (24)
The first term of the expression is the return obtained by the agent when there is no conflict
and B decides, the second one is the return obtained when there is no conflict and A decides
and the last term is the return of entering the conflict stage.
With probability ⇡ the research e↵ort is successful, and the expected value for the agent
is
"
2
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘
+
"
2
+ (1  ")(1  ⇢ A). (25)
The di↵erence between (25) and (24) is given by the second term: if the coin toss is favorable
to A and research is successful, the agent is able to choose the right policy and obtain a
payo↵ equal to 1. Using (5) it is immediate to obtain that the agent acquires information
after receiving message   if and only if
⇡"
2
✓
1 max
⇢
⇢ (1   )
1  ⇢  , 1 
⇢ (1   )
1  ⇢ 
 ◆
  . (26)
A necessary and su cient condition on ", ⇡ and  for the existence of parameters ⇢,   and
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  such that it is optimal for the agent to conducts research after message   is that
⇡"
4
  . (27)
When this condition holds strictly, there are two thresholds ⇢+ and ⇢  such that ⇢   12   
⇢+ and inequality (26) holds if and only if ⇢ 2 [⇢ , ⇢+] . This result is intuitive: A does not
incur the research cost if he is su ciently convinced that the state is either ✓a or ✓b.
After solving (26) we obtain
⇢+ =
⇡"/2  
⇡"/2    ⇢
  =
2
⇡"  ⇡"  + 2  . (28)
The comparative statics of both thresholds with respect to ⇡, k and " are straightforward.
When ⇡ decreases from 1 to (4)/", the threshold prior belief ⇢  increases, while ⇢+ decreases.
In other terms, when research is less successful, the agent incurs the research cost only when
⇢ is close to 12   or, equivalently, when ⇢
 
A is close to 1/2. This is when the agent most values
information. Similarly, when research is more costly (k increases) the agent has weaker
incentives to conduct research: ⇢  increases and ⇢+ decreases. Finally, note that a higher "
makes information acquisition more valuable. In the limit, when " = 0, the agent conducts
research only when k = 0. Because the agent’s expected utility of entering the conflict stage
is linear in his own posterior belief (it equals 1  ⇢A), the value of public information for the
agent is null when " = 0: as long as this information is shared with B, the agent is indi↵erent
between all information structures before starting the conflict phase. The reason for this is
that the value of public information is dissipated in e↵ort. The principal, on the other hand,
is not indi↵erent and values information even when " = 0.
We now study the principal’s message strategy when k = 0 and when k > 0.
7.1. Message Strategy with Costless Research
Suppose k = 0. In this case, the agent always conducts research when he receives message  ,
but not after message ↵.21
21Given that research is costless A is actually indi↵erent between doing and not doing research whenm = a.
To make A strictly prefer the option of not conducting research, it would be enough to suppose that k is
infinitesimal.
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When the agent is allowed to acquire information, P must take into account that his
message will a↵ect the agent’s incentives to conduct research. Compared with the basic
model, sending message ↵ when nature’s signal is   has an additional cost: a hawkish message
induces the agent not to acquire information. In other terms, besides making the agent
hawkish, message ↵ also makes him more dogmatic: the agent is more likely to disregard
evidence that may induce him to revise his beliefs.
The incentives to induce hawkish attitudes are a↵ected by ⇡ and ". To understand the
role of ⇡, consider the extreme case ⇡ = 1 and suppose " 2 (0, 1). Does P have an incentive
to send message ↵ when nature’s signal is  ? It is immediate that when ⇡ = 1 the answer
is negative. To see this, we analyze the consequences for P of sending message   and thus
inducing A to conduct perfectly revealing research. Notice that if the agent discovers that
the state is ✓b, the principal obtains a payo↵ equal to 1, which is strictly greater than the
payo↵ of sending message ↵. If instead A discovers that the current state is ✓a, A would
fight very hard to impose a. In the latter case, the principal obtains the same payo↵ that he
would have obtained by sending the false message ↵. Therefore, research provides valuable
information to the principal and there is never a hawkish equilibrium when ⇡ = 1. In order
to understand how " a↵ects the hawkish region, suppose ⇡ 2 (0, 1) and consider the extreme
case " = 1. When a conflict never arises, it is also immediate to see that the principal has no
incentive to prevent the agent from acquiring information.
Figure 6 illustrates the message strategies in the (⇢, ) space for an intermediate value
of ⇡ and ". There exists a hawkish equilibrium when  , ⇡ and " are su ciently low and ⇢
su ciently large, but the region of parameter values where the hawkish equilibrium exists
has shrunk compared to Figure 1. The higher ⇡ or ", the smaller the hawkish region.
It is interesting to note that when research is costless the dovish region is not a↵ected by
either ⇡ or ". In other terms, the region of parameter values where dovish attitudes occur is
identical to the one characterized in Proposition 2.22 Overall, this suggests that societies that
have access to e cient ways of doing research (such as, well-supplied libraries, media and an
advanced educational system) and societies where conflicts can be more easily avoided are
more prone to either truthtelling or systematic doubts rather than to hawkish attitudes.
22To see this, notice that allowing research does not change the incentives to send   in state ✓a. In fact,
P ’s expected payo↵ of sending   and inducing A to conduct research is greater than the payo↵ of telling the
truth if and only if (16) is greater than (13), which is the same condition obtained in the basic model.
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Figure 6: Costless Research (⇡ = 0.4,   = 0.6, " = 0.1)
Proposition 10 describes the equilibrium message strategy when A is able to conduct
costless research.
PROPOSITION 10: Suppose k = 0. The parameter space (⇢, ) is divided in three regions
that describe the equilibrium strategy of the principal: truthful, dovish and hawkish.
The boundary between the dovish and the truthful regions does not depend on ⇡ or " and is
characterized by Proposition 2.
The incentives to induce hawkish attitudes are decreasing in ⇡ and ". They completely
vanish as either ⇡ or " gets su ciently close to 1.
Since inducing hawkish attitudes prevents the agent from conducting potentially successful
research, Proposition 10 establishes that in case of victory the agent may make mistakes that
could have been avoided if information had been truthfully transmitted.
7.2. Message Strategy when k > 0
When k > 0, the agent may not conduct research even after message  . As discussed above,
the agent does not find it profitable to acquire information when ⇢ /2 [⇢ , ⇢+]. It is immediate
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to see that for all ⇢ /2 [⇢ , ⇢+] the principal faces the same trade-o↵ as in the basic model:
the equilibrium message strategy is therefore described by the cuto↵s of Propositions 2 and
3.
Consider now the region of parameters where A is willing to acquire information after
message  . When k > 0 both the hawkish and the dovish strategies become less profitable
relative to the basic model, but for di↵erent reasons.
To understand why the dovish strategy is less appealing to the principal, first notice that
when P observes ↵, the dovish message   has no e↵ect on payo↵s if conflict is avoided or
research is successful. The principal is able to manipulate the agent only when research is
unsuccessful and conflict takes place. Positive values of " and ⇡ do not a↵ect the incentive
to play dovish when k = 0, but they make the dovish strategy look expensive and ine↵ective
when k > 0. In contrast to the case of costless research, increasing ⇡ and "moves the boundary
of the dovish region (the curve VU in Figure 7) up to the right. Similarly, as k increases, the
incentive of the principal to play the dovish strategy becomes weaker. Thus, a higher k shifts
to the right the boundary between the dovish and the truthful regions. Note however, that
increasing k has another countervailing e↵ect: it shifts ⇢+ to the left, thus decreasing the
parameter region where the agent conducts research. If k increases enough for the agent to
stop conducting research, the dovish strategy may become optimal again for the principal.23
The hawkish strategy is also less appealing to the principal, because when the principal
observes  , he wants the agent to conduct research. Since the principal internalizes only a
fraction of k, research is more valuable to him than it is to the agent. Sending the hawkish
message ↵ discourages the agent from conducting research, which the principal values, and
this makes the hawkish strategy less profitable relative to the basic model. This e↵ect is
weaker as the cost of research k increases, and is stronger as research becomes more e↵ective
(higher ⇡) and more useful (higher ").
The equilibrium strategy of the principal is shown in Figure 7 for a given set of parameters.
The vertical dashed line in Figure 7 is drawn at ⇢+. Proposition 11 describes the equilibrium
message strategy when research is costly.
PROPOSITION 11: Suppose k > 0. For all ⇢ /2 [⇢ , ⇢+], the agent does not acquire infor-
23We have the largest dovish regions for extreme values of k: when k = 0 (see Figure 6) and when k is so
large that research is never conducted (see Figure 1).
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mation in equilibrium and the equilibrium message strategy is described by Propositions
2 and 3.
For all ⇢ 2 [⇢ , ⇢+] , the incentives to induce a dovish attitude are decreasing in ⇡, k and ".
For all ⇢ 2 [⇢ , ⇢+] , the incentives to induce a hawkish attitude are increasing in k and
decreasing in ⇡ and ".
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Figure 7: Costly Research (⇡ = 0.4,   = 0.6, " = 0.3, k = 0.01)
8. Conclusions
As argued by Karl Popper (1963), conflicts are less violent when individuals entertain the
possibility that the opponent may be right. Why is it so di cult to observe this attitude?
To answer this question, we consider two opponents who participate in a game of conflict.
One opponent trusts the information received by his principal.
In our model, the principal wants to a↵ect the agent’s e↵ort, but he also cares that the
agent selects the correct policy and that he has the right incentives to acquire information.
In the context of our model, information is sometimes manipulated. In some cases, as a
result of the principal’s message, the agent never doubts about the possibility of being wrong,
although all available information suggests otherwise. The agent is motivated to exert high
e↵ort: this leads to excessive violence. Moreover, we show that hawkish attitudes make the
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agent more dogmatic: the agent disregards evidence that may induce him to revise his beliefs.
In other cases, the agent believes that his opponent may be right even when all the evidence
indicates beyond any doubt that the policy preferred by the opponent is suboptimal. In this
case, doubts moderate the escalation of violence in the conflict but the agent often loses.
We argue that manipulation of information (in both directions) is more likely to occur
in heterogenous societies and when nature’s signals are less precise. Hawkish attitudes are
less likely to be observed when the agent is able to conduct autonomous research and when
the principal’s altruism is low. When instead altruism is high, we obtain that the agent is
induced by his principal to always doubt.
Moreover, we show that conflicts are more likely in heterogenous societies. However, the
intensity of a conflict is not necessarily at its maximum in very heterogeneous societies.
An interesting extension that we leave to future research would be to consider other
forms of naivete´ on the part of the agent. For instance, we could suppose that the agent
misestimates the precision of the signal received by the principal or is excessively confident
about his/her ability to win the conflict. We believe that even in these alternative settings the
actions of the principle would be driven by similar considerations. We expect, for instance,
that a principal with low altruism would motivate the agent by boosting his overconfidence (a
similar motive is described by Charness et al., 2011), while a more altruistic principal would
tend to discourage overconfidence in order to de-escalate the conflict.
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 36
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let message m be given. Suppose first that 1/2 < ⇢mA < 1. We proceed by steps. We first show that the
equilibrium expected payo↵ of B is strictly positive. To see this, notice that A never exerts an e↵ort level
higher than his valuation, 2⇢mA   1, because he would earn a return below 1   ⇢mA . This implies that B can
guarantee for himself a strictly positive payo↵ by exerting an e↵ort level just above 2⇢mA   1.
We now show that the e↵ort strategies of both players are mixed, with no mass points at a strictly positive
e↵ort level. By way of contradiction, suppose that player j has a mass point at a particular e↵ort cj > 0.
Then, the payo↵ of the other player would increase discontinuously at cj . It then follows that there exists a
" > 0 such that the other player exerts e↵ort on the interval [cj   ", cj ] with zero probability. However, if
this were the case, j would increase his payo↵ by bidding cj   " instead of cj .
We now argue that the maximum e↵ort level of the two players is the same. To see this, notice that
since the e↵ort strategies are mixed, if one individual has a maximum e↵ort level, the other individual would
win with probability one by just exerting that e↵ort level.
Next, we now show that the minimum e↵ort level is zero. By way of contradiction, suppose that an
individual has a minimum e↵ort level c 2 (0, 2⇢mA   1] . Then the other player would not exert e↵ort in
the interval [0, c) because by doing so he would lose with probability one. But this implies that the first
individual would rather exert an e↵ort level lower than c.
Individual B’s expected payo↵ from exerting e↵ort cB is
EUB = GA(cB)  cB , (A.1)
while A’s expected payo↵ from exerting e↵ort cA is
EUA = (1  ⇢mA ) +GB(cA) (2⇢mA   1)  cA. (A.2)
Noticing that B must be indi↵erent among all the e↵ort levels in the set and recalling that the equilibrium
expected payo↵ for B is strictly positive, we evaluate EUB when cB = 0. It follows that GA(0) > 0.
We now show that B cannot put positive mass at zero. If this were the case, there would be a tie with
some positive probability. But B would be better o↵ increasing his e↵ort just above zero. This implies that
GB(0) = 0 and A’s expected payo↵ is 1  ⇢mA . Then,
GB(cA) =
cA
2⇢mA   1
. (A.3)
When B’s e↵ort is 2⇢mA   1,
EUB = GA(2⇢
m
A   1)  (2⇢mA   1), (A.4)
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or
EUB = 1  (2⇢mA   1). (A.5)
Then,
GA(cB) = 1  (2⇢mA   1) + cB . (A.6)
When ⇢mA = 1 the equilibrium strategies can be obtained by taking the limit of the equilibrium strategies
described above.
Finally, when ⇢mA < 1/2 it is immediate that the agent does not enter the conflict: cB = cA = 0. Thus,
policy b is chosen.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1. ⇤
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Two cases must be considered. First, suppose that nature sends signal  . Using Bayes’ Rule, we obtain that
⇢ P =
⇢(1   )
1  ⇢+ ⇢(1   ) . (A.7)
If the condition on ⇢ in the statement of Lemma 1 is satisfied, this implies that ⇢ P  1/2. Suppose that P
is truthful and sends message  . Then, by the naivete assumption ⇢ A is equal to (A.7). Since ⇢
 
A  1/2, A
exerts no e↵ort and B picks policy b. The expected payo↵ to the principal is then
1  ⇢ P  
1
2
. (A.8)
Suppose instead that the principal sends the false message ↵. In this case, a total conflict arises and, using
(19), the principal’s expected payo↵ would be
  
2
+
1
2
, (A.9)
which is lower than 1/2. This implies that a deviation from a truthful report is not profitable when the
actual signal is  .
Second, suppose that s = ↵. If the principal sends message ↵ his expected payo↵ is
  
2
+
1
2
, (A.10)
which is greater than zero, the payo↵ obtained by sending message   which shifts ⇢ A below 1/2 and thus
induces A to exert no e↵ort. This implies that a deviation from a truthful report is also not profitable when
the actual signal is ↵. ⇤
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 38
First note, using Bayes’ Rule (5), that when ⇢ > 12   we have ⇢
 
i > 1/2, for i = P,A. To prove Lemma
1, we show that when the signal is ↵ the principal has a strict incentive to send message  . This can be
understood by noticing that being truthful gives P the expected payo↵ (13), which is equal to zero when
  = 1. Instead, inducing a dovish attitude gives P the expected payo↵ (16), which is strictly positive when
  = 1. It is thus straightforward to conclude that sending message   when s = ↵ is preferable for a fully
altruistic principal.
Second, we show that when the signal is   the principal has a strict incentive to send message  . Sending
message ↵ gives the payo↵ (19), which is zero when   = 1. Sending message   gives the payo↵ (18), which is
strictly positive when   = 1. It is thus straightforward to conclude that sending message   is preferable for
a fully altruistic principal also when s =  . ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Step 1: When
⇢  1
2    , (A.11)
P is truthful.
See Lemma 1.
Step 2: When
1
2    < ⇢ 
1
2 (1   ) +   , (A.12)
P is also truthful.
First, suppose that s =   and that the principal is truthful. If the condition in the statement of Step 2
is met, ⇢ A > 1/2. Then, a conflict arises. The principal’s expected utility of sending a truthful message is
given by (18). Since ⇢ P = ⇢
 
A when reporting is truthful, we can rewrite (18) as
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘ 1   ⇣2⇢ A   1⌘
2
+ 2
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘2
. (A.13)
To see whether P has an incentive to deviate and send message m = ↵ when the actual signal is  , we
compare (A.13) to (19), the expected utility after the deviation. To show that (19) is lower than (A.13)
when the condition in the statement of Step 2 is met, take the derivative of (A.13) with respect to ⇢ A:
 2 (2⇢ A   1) + 1  4(1  ⇢ A). (A.14)
This derivative can be written as
(1  2 )(2⇢ A   1) + 2(⇢ A   1). (A.15)
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Knowing that 1   ⇢ A > 1/2 and that 1       1/2, one can verify that the derivative is always negative.
Since (19) is equal to (A.13) when ⇢ A = 1, we have proved that (19) is lower than (A.13). Therefore, P has
no incentive to send message ↵ when s =  .
To conclude the proof of Step 2, we have to show that the principal does not want to deviate even when
s = ↵. The principal utility from truthful reporting is (13) while the utility of sending message   is (16).
One can show that when
⇢ A 
1
2 
, (A.16)
the principal has no incentive to misreport. In fact, when ⇢ A = 1/(2 ) and ⇢
↵
A = 1 expressions (13) and (16)
coincide. Between the two roots, (13) is greater than (16). When ⇢ A  1/(2 ) we have that (13) is lower
than (16): P has no incentive to misreport when s = ↵. Knowing that ⇢ A is given by (5), it is easy to show
that ⇢ A  1/(2 ) if and only if
⇢  1
2 (1   ) +   . (A.17)
Step 3: When
⇢ >
1
2 (1   ) +   , (A.18)
P sends message   regardless of nature’s signals.
Following the algebra of Step 2, we obtain that when the condition in the statement of Step 3 is satisfied,
P has an incentive to send message   when the actual signal is ↵. When instead s =   the report is truthful.
It then follows that regardless of s, P always sends message  .
This concludes the proof of Proposition 2. ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Step 1: When
⇢  1
2    , (A.19)
P is truthful.
See Lemma 1.
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Step 2: When
1
2    < ⇢ 
1
2(1   )(1   ) +   , (A.20)
P is truthful.
First, suppose that s =  . Since
1
2    < ⇢, (A.21)
we have that ⇢ A > 1/2. Then, a conflict arises. The principal’s expected utility of sending a truthful message
is given by (A.13). To see whether P has an incentive to deviate and send message m = ↵ when the actual
signal is  , we compute his utility after this deviation. This is given by (19). In comparing (A.13) to (19),
one can show that when   < 1/2 it may be the case that (19) is greater than (A.13). However, when
⇢ A 
1
2(1   ) , (A.22)
(19) is lower than (A.13). Then, P has no incentive to send message ↵ when he receives signal  . Knowing
that ⇢ A is given by (5), it is easy to verify that (A.22) is satisfied if and only if
⇢  1
2(1   )(1   ) +   . (A.23)
Finally, suppose that the actual signal is s = ↵. The principal’s utility from truthful reporting is (13), while
the utility of sending message   is given by (16). One can show that when   < 1/2 the principal has no
incentive to misreport.
Step 3: When
⇢ >
1
2(1   )(1   ) +   , (A.24)
P sends message ↵ regardless of nature’s signals.
This follows from the algebra in the previous step.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3. ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Step 1: We show that the incidence of conflict is increasing in ⇢.
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First, we compute the probability that a conflict occurs:
Pr (conflict) =
(
 ⇢ if ⇢  12   ,
1 if ⇢ > 12   .
(A.25)
To understand (A.25), notice that for all m we have that ⇢mA > 1/2 when ⇢ > 1/(2    ). This implies that
regardless of P ’s message strategy, conflicts always occur when ⇢ > 1/(2   ). When instead ⇢  1/(2   ),
one can verify from Propositions 2 and 3 that P is truthful. Since ⇢ A  1/2, a conflict arises only when P
sends message ↵, an event occurring with probability  ⇢.
Note that the probability of observing a conflict is obviously increasing in ⇢.
We now move to the proof of the second part of Proposition 4. As a measure of the intensity of conflict,
we compute expected total e↵ort by taking expectations over the space of possible signals. Let  (s) denote
the probability of observing signal s, which can be derived from (3) and (4). Expected total e↵ort as of time
0 is then given by
E(cA + cB) =  ( )E(cA + cB ; ) +  (↵)E(cA + cB ;↵). (A.26)
First, knowing the conditional probabilities (3) and (4), we derive the probabilities of the two signals.
 ( ) = 1   ⇢ and  (↵) =  ⇢. (A.27)
From (A.26), (12), and the results of Proposition 3, we write the expression for E (cA + cB) when   < 1/2:
E (cA + cB) =
8>><>>:
 ⇢ if ⇢  12   ,
 ⇢+ (1   ⇢)(2⇢ A   1)⇢ A if 12   < ⇢  b⇢,
1 if ⇢ > b⇢. (A.28)
Using the results of Proposition 2, we write the expression for E (cA + cB) when     1/2:
E (cA + cB) =
8>><>>:
 ⇢ if ⇢  12   ,
 ⇢+ (1   ⇢)(2⇢ A   1)⇢ A if 12   < ⇢  ⇢,
(2⇢ A   1)⇢ A if ⇢ > ⇢.
(A.29)
Step 2: We show that E (cA + cB) is weakly increasing in ⇢ when   < 1/2.
To see this, we first show that
 ⇢+ (1   ⇢)(2⇢ A   1)⇢ A (A.30)
is increasing in ⇢. Knowing (5), we find the derivative of (A.30) with respect to ⇢:
  + (1   )(2⇢ A   1) + ⇢
2(1   )2
(1   ⇢)2 (A.31)
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which is positive since (2⇢ A   1) is positive, ⇢ 2 (1/2, 1), and 0     1. Moreover, note that (A.30) is equal
to  ⇢ when ⇢ = 1/(2    ), and that (A.31) is greater than  , the slope of E (cA + cB) when ⇢  1/(2    ).
Finally, note that (A.30) is lower than one: that is, right after ⇢ = b⇢, total e↵ort jumps.
Step 3: We show that E (cA + cB) is not monotone in ⇢ when   > 1/2.
It is enough to show that right after ⇢ = ⇢, total e↵ort drops. This is obvious since
(2⇢ A   1)⇢ A < 1. (A.32)
This concludes the proof of Proposition 4. ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
First, for a candidate truthful equilibrium, the equilibrium conditions for all three players are the same
regardless of whether the agent is naive or sophisticated. Therefore the parameter regions for which this
strategy profile is an equilibrium is the same in the sophisticated agent case, as it is in the naive agent case.
Second, when the agent is sophisticated, the information transmission game falls in the category of cheap
talk games. It is well known that these games always have a babbling equilibrium, where the receivers (in
this case players A and B) ignore the sender’s message (in this case the principal) and where the sender does
not provide any information. See for example Crawford and Sobel (1982). ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof of (i): Non existence of a dovish equilibrium.
Suppose, by contradiction, that a dovish equilibrium exists. Then on the equilibrium path, the principal
always sends message  , regardless of what he observes. In case of conflict, the strategies of players A and B
are as described in Proposition 1, with the posterior belief ⇢ A. We now distinguish two cases, depending on
whether ⇢ A  1/2 or ⇢ A > 1/2.
Case 1: Suppose first that ⇢ A  1/2. Then none of the players exerts any e↵ort on the equilibrium path
and policy b is selected. Consider now the information set of the principal where he has observed signal ↵
from nature. His interim expected payo↵ on the equilibrium path is 0. If he deviates by sending instead
message ↵, the e↵ort of player B remains the same. The agent A will now exert a positive, but almost null,
level of e↵ort c > 0, and win the conflict with probability 1. The principal’s interim expected payo↵ from
deviating is now 1   c > 0. This contradicts that the dovish profile is an equilibrium.
Gordon and Riboni 43
Case 2: Suppose now that ⇢ A > 1/2. Then on the equilibrium path, player B randomizes his e↵ort
uniformly on
h
0, 2⇢ A   1
i
and player A randomizes on the same interval, but with an atom at 0. Moreover
the expected payo↵ of agent A given his posterior ⇢ A and as a function of his choice of e↵ort cA is given by
EUA =
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘
+GB (cA)
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
  cA, (A.33)
which is constant for all cA 2
h
0, 2⇢ A   1
i
. Consider now the information set of the principal where he has
observed signal ↵ from nature. His expected payo↵ if the agent chooses e↵ort cA is
EUP = GB (cA)   cA, (A.34)
which is strictly increasing in cA. If the principal deviates and sends message ↵, agent A’s expected payo↵ is
now
EUA = GB (cA)  cA (A.35)
which is strictly increasing in cA on
h
0, 2⇢ A   1
i
. In fact, the optimal choice for the agent is now the e↵ort
cA = 2⇢
 
A   1 + ", which gives the principal a higher expected payo↵ EUP than he had on the equilibrium
path. The contradicts that the dovish profile is an equilibrium.
We conclude that there is never a dovish equilibrium when communication is private.
Proof of (ii): Conditions for a hawkish equilibrium.
In a hawkish equilibrium, on the equilibrium path, the principal sends message ↵, regardless of what he
observes. In case of conflict, the strategies of players A and B are as described in Proposition 1, with the
posterior belief ⇢↵A = 1. Then both A and B randomize their e↵ort level uniformly on [0, 1] . Consider now
the information set of the principal where he has observed signal   from nature. His expected payo↵ if the
agent chooses e↵ort cA is
EUP =
⇣
1  ⇢ P
⌘
+GB (cA)
⇣
2⇢ P   1
⌘
   cA =
⇣
1  ⇢ P
⌘
+ cA
⇣
2⇢ P   1
⌘
   cA. (A.36)
By deviating to message  , the principal could induce the agent to exert no e↵ort. Such a deviation is not
profitable for the principal if and only if his expected payo↵ is nondecreasing in e↵ort, which is the case if
and only if
2⇢ P   1      0,
which is equivalent to ⇢   ⇢H , with
⇢H =
 + 1
2    +    .
This concludes the proof of (ii) and the proof of Proposition 6. ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
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The e↵ort choices in a truthful equilibrium are characterized in Proposition 8. To prove the proposition,
it only remains to show that the truthtelling constraints of the principal hold if and only if expression (22) is
weakly greater than expression (23). We do this in two steps.
First consider the principal’s information set where he observes the signal ↵ from nature. If he truthfully
reports ↵, the agent is indi↵erent between e↵ort levels in (c⇤A, c
⇤
A + ⇢ ] , where
c⇤A = max
n
0,
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
(1  ⇢ )
o
(A.37)
Because the principal’s subjective marginal cost of e↵ort is lower than the agent’s cost of e↵ort, the principal’s
preference is weakly increasing in these e↵ort levels. Consequently, he cannot possibly gain by deviating to
message   which would induce the agent to exert less e↵ort.
Second, consider the principal’s information set where he observes the signal   from nature. If ⇢ A  1/2,
truthfully reporting   induces the agent not to exert any e↵ort and policy b gets selected, which gives the
principal an expected payo↵ 1   ⇢ A, which cannot be improved upon by sending message ↵, which would
induce the agent to exert e↵ort that the principal would consider wasteful. Let us then restrict attention to
the case where ⇢ A > 1/2. If the principal truthfully reports  , his expected payo↵ is given by (22). If he
deviates, his expected payo↵ is given by (23). Therefore a truthful equilibrium exists if and only if expression
(22) is weakly greater than expression (23). Since this inequality contains the case ⇢ A  1/2, it is necessary
and su cient for a truthful equilibrium, for all values of ⇢ A.
After some algebra, we obtain the following characterization of the truthful region: a truthful equilibrium
exists if and only if ⇢  ⇢T ( ,  ), where
⇢T ( ,  ) =  
⇣
3
2    4 + 4     2
⌘
2 (2      2 )  
r⇣
3
2    4 + 4     2
⌘2
  6 (2      2 ) (1   )
2 (2      2 ) for   6= 1   /2
⇢T ( ,  ) =
3
4    for   = 1   /2.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 9. ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 10 AND 11
Step 1: No research region: ⇢ /2 [⇢ , ⇢+] .
When ⇢ /2 [⇢ , ⇢+] , the agent does not conduct research, following the principal’s message. For this
reason, the precise values of parameters ⇡, " and k have no impact on equilibrium (as long as ⇢ /2 [⇢ , ⇢+]
holds). The equilibria are as in the main model. A higher k increases this region in the sense of inclusion by
increasing ⇢  and decreasing ⇢+. Increasing ⇡ or " has the opposite e↵ects.
We now analyze the model when k   0 and  ,⇡, " 2 (0, 1) and ⇢ 2 [⇢ , ⇢+] . In particular, we assume
that ⇡"4   k. For these parameters, the agent conducts research, following message  .
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Step 2: No counter signalling.
The principal can play four di↵erent strategies, depending on whether he sends ↵ or   when observing ↵
or  . Which strategy arises in equilibrium depends on parameters.
However, there are no parameters for which the counter-signalling strategy of sending ↵ when observing
  (and vice-versa) is a best response for the principal.
To see this, note that the principal’s interim expected payo↵ of sending ↵ is always the same, regardless of
what he observes. On the other hand, his interim expected payo↵ of sending   depends on what he observed:
it is strictly higher when he observed  . In fact, whether or not information acquisition is successful, the
principal strictly prefers to send   when he actually observes   than when he observes ↵. This rules out
counter-signalling.
In the continuation, we characterize the parameter regions for which each of the three remaining strategies
is optimal. More precisely, as we did in the main model, we characterize the boundary of the dovish-research
region, and the boundary of the hawkish-research region. The complement of the union of these two regions
is the truthful-research region.
Step 3: The dovish-research boundary.
Fixing  ,⇡ and ", in (⇢, ) space, this boundary separates, on one side, the dovish-research region Dr
and on the other hand, the union Tr [Hr of the truthful-research and hawkish-research regions. When the
principal observes signal ↵, so that his own belief is 1, if he sends message ↵ to the agent, the agent updates
his belief to 1. This gives the principal the expected payo↵
1
2
(1   +  ") .
If he sends message  , the agent conducts and with probability ⇡, updates his belief to 1 as well. With
probability 1  ⇡, the agent keeps the belief ⇢ A.
If ⇢ A  1/2, this gives the principal the interim expected payo↵
⇡
2
(1   +  ")  k ,
which is lesser than the expected payo↵ he can obtain by sending ↵. Because ⇢ A  1/2 i↵ ⇢  12   , we
conclude that the set
h
⇢ , 12  
i
is included in the truthful region UTH .
If ⇢ A > 1/2, the principal’s interim expected payo↵ equals
(1  ⇡) (1  ")
✓
  
2
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘2
+
1
2
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘◆
+ ⇡
✓
1
2
(1   +  ")
◆
+ (1  ⇡) "
2
  k .
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Therefore the principal sends message   (dovish-research region) if and only if the net gain  Dr of sending
↵ over  
 Dr ⌘ (1   ) +  
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘2
 
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
+
2k 
(1  ⇡) (1  ")
is nonpositive. The boundary is defined by the equation  Dr = 0.
When k = 0 (as in Proposition 10), this equation does not depend on ⇡ or " and coincides with the dovish
boundary characterized in Proposition2.
When k increases above 0, because @ 
Dr
@k > 0, the region Dr decreases in the sense of inclusion. It
decreases within the entire research region, but also because the entire research region itself decreases. The
overall e↵ect on the dovish region is ambiguous, because as k increases, the shrinking dovish-research region
is at the same time replaced by the dovish-no-research region, which is larger.
When k > 0, because @ 
Dr
@" > 0 and
@ Dr
@⇡ > 0, as either " or ⇡ increases, the region Dr decreases in the
sense that it looses field to the union Tr[Hr. It grows in another way, which is that the entire research region
itself increases. The overall e↵ect on the dovish region is a decrease in the sense of inclusion. As either " or
⇡ increases, the dovish-research shrinks and at the same time replaces the dovish-no-research region, which
is larger.
Step 4: The hawkish-research boundary.
Fixing  ,⇡ and ", in the (⇢, ) space, this boundary separates, on one side, the hawkish-research region
Hr and on the other hand, the union Tr [Dr of the truthful-research and dovish-research regions. When the
principal observes signal  , so that his own belief is ⇢ P , if he sends message ↵ to the agent, the agent updates
his belief to 1. This gives the principal the expected payo↵
1
2
(1   +  ") .
If he sends message  , the agent conducts research and with probability ⇡⇢ P , updates his belief to 1 as
well, and with probability ⇡
⇣
1  ⇢ P
⌘
, he updates his belief to 0. With probability 1   ⇡, the agent keeps
the belief ⇢ A.
If ⇢ A  1/2, this gives the principal the interim expected payo↵
⇡⇢ P
✓
1
2
(1   +  ")
◆
+ ⇡
⇣
1  ⇢ P
⌘
+ (1  ⇡)
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘
  k 
= ⇡⇢ P
✓
1
2
(1   +  ")
◆
+
⇣
1  ⇢ P
⌘
  k .
Therefore the principal sends message ↵ (dovish-research region) if and only if the net gain  Hr of sending
  over ↵ is nonpositive. We have
 Hr ⌘
⇣
1  ⇢ P
⌘
+
⇣
⇡⇢ P   1
⌘✓1
2
(1   +  ")
◆
  k 
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 
✓
1  1
2
◆
+
✓
⇡
1
2
  1
◆✓
1
2
(1   +  ")
◆
  k 
  min
⇢
⇡
2
,
1  "
2
+
⇡"
4
  k
 
  0.
Because ⇢ A  1/2 i↵ ⇢  12   , we conclude that the set of pairs (⇢, ) such that ⇢ 2
h
⇢ , 12  
i
is included
in region Tr [ Hr. From Step 2, we already know that it is included in the region Tr [ Dr, therefore it is
included in the region Tr.
If ⇢ A > 1/2, the principal’s interim expected payo↵ when sending message   equals
(1  ⇡)
✓
(1  ")
✓
  
2
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘2
+
1
2
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
+ 2
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘◆
+
"
2
◆
+⇡
✓
1
2
(1   +  ") ⇢ A + 1  ⇢ A
◆
  k .
Therefore the principal sends message ↵ (hawkish-research region) if and only if the net gain  Hr of
sending   over ↵
 Hr = (1  ⇡)
✓
(1  ")
✓
  
2
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘2
+
1
2
⇣
2⇢ A   1
⌘
+ 2
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘◆
+
"
2
◆
+⇡
✓
1
2
(1   +  ") ⇢ A + 1  ⇢ A
◆
  k   1
2
(1   +  ") .
=
⇣
1  ⇢ A
⌘ h⇡
2
(1 +   (1  ")) + (1  ⇡) (1  ")
⇣
1  2⇢ A
⌘
+ 2 (1  ⇡) (1  ") ⇢ A
i
  k .h⇡
2
(1 +   (1  ")) + (1  ⇡) (1  ")
⇣
1  2⇢ A
⌘
+ 2 (1  ⇡) (1  ") ⇢ A
i
.
is nonpositive. The boundary is defined by the equation  Hr = 0.
When k = 0, we obtain the hawkish boundary’s equation is
⇢ A =
1
2 (1   ) +
⇡
2 (1 +   (1  "))
2 (1   ) (1  ⇡) (1  ")
⇢ (1   )
1  ⇢  =
1
2 (1   ) +
⇡
2 (1 +   (1  "))
2 (1   ) (1  ⇡) (1  ")
which coincides with the hawkish boundary characterized in Proposition 3 in the main model, i↵ ⇡ = 0. This
gives us a strictly increasing function ⇢ ( ) .
When k = 0, because @ 
Hr
@" > 0 and
@ Hr
@⇡ > 0, when either " or ⇡ increases, the region Hr decreases in
the sense of inclusion. If either " or ⇡ is close enough to 1, the region Hr is empty.
As k increases above zero, holding the other parameters fixed, and with " > 0 and ⇡ > 0, the region Hr
increases in the sense that it gains field against the truthful region, but decreases due to the decrease of the
entire research region, because ⇢+ decreases as k increases. As k increases, the overall e↵ect on the hawkish
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region is an increase in the sense of inclusion, because the growing hawkish-research region is progressively
replaced by the hawkish-no-research region, which is larger.
When k > 0, the equation  Hr = 0 implies that @ 
Hr
@" > 0 and
@ Hr
@" > 0. Therefore when either " or ⇡
increases, the region Hr decreases in the sense that it looses field against the truthful region, but increases
due to the increase of the entire research region, because ⇢+ decreases as k increases.. If either " or ⇡ is close
enough to 1, the region Hr is empty. As either " or ⇡ increases, the overall e↵ect on the hawkish region is
a decrease in the sense of inclusion, because the shrinking hawkish-research region progressively replaces the
hawkish-no-research region, which is larger.
This concludes the proof of Propositions 10 and 11. ⇤
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